The recent flare-up between Pakistan and Afghanistan has once again set the region on edge, reviving ghosts of history and exposing the fragility of Pakistan’s two-front dilemma. On its eastern border lies an old adversary, India, whose hostility has defined Pakistan’s security priorities for decades. On the northwestern side, however, a new-old challenge has emerged. Relations with Afghanistan, always shaped by external alignments and great-power interests, have descended into confrontation. The exchange of airstrikes, artillery, and retaliatory fire across the border is not just a tactical crisis; it is the manifestation of Pakistan’s larger strategic predicament one that spans internal insecurity, regional rivalry, and global realignments.
Pakistan’s western policy has long been determined by the U.S. factor. During the Cold War, Islamabad served as a bulwark against Soviet expansion, supporting the Afghan Mujahideen as a proxy for the West. When the USSR disintegrated, Pakistan found itself dealing with the Taliban’s rise in Kabul, a government with which it shared both cultural familiarity and strategic comfort. But after 9/11, the equation flipped. Pakistan became a “major non-NATO ally” in America’s Global War on Terror, a costly partnership that brought both aid and agony. The U.S led occupation ended two decades later with the Taliban’s return, Taliban 2.0, ushering in a regime that, despite sanctions and non-recognition, reached out to Russia, China, and even India. These moves rattled Washington, which now contemplates regaining strategic presence in the region, including a potential return to Bagram Airbase. For Pakistan, this shifting balance has meant increasing uncertainty, especially as Washington under Biden marginalized Islamabad while strengthening its partnership with India to contain China.
Yet the geopolitical pendulum may be swinging again. Donald Trump’s renewed engagement signals a possible recalibration. His emphasis on mineral deals, investment, and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan could restore some of Islamabad’s lost leverage. However, the regional environment remains treacherous. India’s growing role in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, along with its deepening ties with Russia, has blurred the lines between old blocs. Islamabad now faces a multipolar region where loyalties are fluid and interests collide. Afghanistan’s overtures to India have raised deep suspicions in Islamabad. In such a fluid landscape, the recent border clashes appear not as isolated incidents but as symptoms of a broader strategic shift.
Domestically, Pakistan’s internal security landscape adds combustible fuel to this fire. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal areas have once again become hotbeds of militant activity. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has exploited the porous frontier and the Islami Emirates’ reluctance to act against it. Attacks on security forces in KP and North Waziristan have multiplied, killing dozens in recent months. Islamabad’s decision to strike militant hideouts inside Afghan territory was, therefore, as much an act of necessity as defiance. But every strike carries the risk of blowback. Kabul’s retaliatory attacks, including artillery exchanges and reported assaults on Pakistani outposts, show that the Taliban regime is neither submissive nor indifferent. Both sides are testing limits, and the danger of miscalculation looms large.
The real question is whether Pakistan can afford escalation on two fronts simultaneously. With the Line of Control with India perpetually volatile, and the Afghan frontier heating up, Islamabad’s armed forces face the unenviable task of dividing attention and resources. Historically, Pakistan’s security doctrine has been India-centric, but the shifting balance demands an uncomfortable rethinking. A simultaneous eastern and western threat could stretch the military thin, erode deterrence, and embolden internal insurgents. The Taliban’s retaliation is also a reminder that ideological affinity does not guarantee strategic alignment. The old assumption that a friendly regime in Kabul ensures western stability has been proven false. The Taliban now act as independent power brokers, leveraging relations with China, Russia, Iran, and India to gain diplomatic weight. Pakistan, once their patron, is now merely one of several interlocutors.
Globally, the crisis reflects broader geopolitical contestation. China and Russia view Afghanistan as a strategic gateway into Central Asia and a bulwark against Western influence. Both have cultivated ties with the Taliban, offering investment and recognition in exchange for stability. For Washington, this emerging triangle threatens its ability to contain China’s regional outreach. Pakistan, caught in the middle, faces a familiar dilemma: how to balance between a transactional U.S. and a strategic China without alienating either. Its attempt to regain relevance through cooperation with the U.S. may antagonize Beijing, while overreliance on China risks Western isolation. Thus, the border crisis is not merely about military exchanges; it is also about strategic signaling that which camp Pakistan intends to belong to in the evolving world order.
Amid these power plays, Pakistan’s credibility is on trial. The airstrikes against Afghan targets project strength, but sustaining deterrence requires more than shows of force. If operations produce civilian casualties or fail to degrade militant networks, they risk turning public sentiment against the state and inviting international criticism. Moreover, if Islamabad’s policy oscillates between confrontation and appeasement, it weakens its deterrent posture. Credibility is built on consistency, not crisis management. Pakistan’s leaders must therefore walk a narrow line assertive enough to protect sovereignty, restrained enough to avoid strategic isolation.
What then are the viable policy options? A full-scale confrontation with Afghanistan is neither winnable nor wise. Pakistan’s best path lies in calibrated coercion: limited strikes combined with backchannel diplomacy. Confidence-building measures such as joint border commissions or mediated ceasefires, perhaps facilitated by China or Qatar, could prevent further escalation. Internally, consolidating control in KP and improving intelligence coordination are imperative to choke off TTP sanctuaries. At the diplomatic level, Islamabad must reclaim narrative space. Its actions should be framed internationally as defensive, lawful, and aimed at preserving regional peace rather than undermining Afghan sovereignty. Regionally, multilateral engagement through the SCO or OIC could help distribute pressure and project Pakistan as a responsible actor seeking stability rather than conflict.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s greatest challenge is not Afghanistan alone but the convergence of internal insecurity, regional rivalry, and global realignment. The “two-front” threat demands a shift from reactionary military responses to proactive strategic planning. Pakistan’s credibility will depend on whether it can turn crises into opportunities: stabilizing its frontier, recalibrating alliances, and projecting itself as a rational stakeholder rather than a reactive state.
The fires along the border are, in essence, a reflection of Pakistan’s own crossroads. It stands between restraint and retaliation, between regional leadership and isolation, between tactical gain and strategic exhaustion. The coming days will determine which path it chooses. A hasty response may offer momentary relief, but only a coherent, multi-layered policy can secure lasting peace. If Islamabad manages to control escalation while asserting sovereignty, it will not only avert another endless conflict but also reaffirm its place as a pivotal power in a region once again at the heart of global attention.
Written by: Inam Ullah Lecturer in IR NUML Peshawar
